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Abstract 
 
This article recounts how a number of strategic infrastructure investment decisions in airport and rail 
development taken by the Singapore government were at variance with recommendations 
emerging from Cost-Benefit Analysis, but were considered necessary to support external 
competitiveness.  This link between infrastructure provision and economic development may 
require decision makers to assess the trade-off between prudent macro-economic planning and 
efficient micro-economic management for major projects.  In the case of airport hubs, the most 
difficult assessment might be the game consideration of how much, and how far ahead, excess 
capacity is needed to ensure the dominance of the hub.  
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1. Introduction 
The concept of sustainable cities is multi-faceted, encompassing economic, environmental, 
social and political dimensions.   This article is written from the perspective of transport 
infrastructure in the development of sustainable cities, in particular that of strategic (as opposed 
to incremental) infrastructure investments in airport and rail development.  These infrastructure 
investments tend to be lumpy, with the decisions usually made by governments with inputs from 
consultants working in the private sector or with international agencies.  Examples of such major 
projects include the Third London Airport, the Channel Tunnel, the Betuwe Line, the TGV in 
France, and the Oresund and Storebealt crossings.  The alleged potential contribution of these 
projects to the economic development of the respective city, region or country they serve 
featured prominently in the debates and final decisions by the governments to proceed.   
This link between infrastructure provision and economic growth has been the subject of 
extensive discussion during the last decade (Banister and Berechman, 2000). At the planning 
level, it has enhanced concern to ensure that appraisal methods deal adequately with growth 
impact, environmental and social consequences, as well as with economic welfare as more 
traditionally measured.  This is evident, for example, in the frameworks recently adopted for use 
by the transportation authorities in the United Kingdom1 and the United States2. 
Singapore presents an interesting case because of the attention long given there to 
dimensions now more to the fore in other parts of the world: sustainability, international 
competitiveness, major public investments structuring the context for private activity, and 
marginal social cost pricing of land transport in the form of quotas on motor vehicle ownership 
and road pricing (Willoughby, 2001).  In this article we use the case of strategic infrastructure 
decisions made by the Singapore government in airport and rail development to illustrate the 
importance of such decisions in the sustainable development of Singapore. 
                                                
1  UK Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998). 
2  US Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration (1999). 
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 To much of the outside world, Singapore is best known as an international air and shipping 
hub in the global transportation network. Its airport has consistently won numerous international 
awards in recognition of its achievements in airport, retail and cargo facilities and services.  
Singapore, however, only has a population of 4 million people and a land area of 680 square 
km.  A British colony for many years, Singapore attained self-government in 1959, joined 
Malaysia in 1963 and became an independent city-state in 1965.  As a result of its small size 
and sovereign status, urban issues are national issues while some traditional urban problems 
(such as rural urban migration and city versus nation) do not exist.   
Without any natural resource except for its strategic location, the country is economically 
dependent on trade, capital and labour flows.  Foreign capital and labour has been fundamental 
to the economic success of Singapore.  Today, there are over 5,000 foreign companies located 
in Singapore and many multinational corporations have established regional operating and 
manufacturing bases on the island.  Full employment was achieved by the early 1970s and the 
average annual growth rate in real per capita GNP has been about 6.5%. Foreigners comprise a 
quarter of its 4 million population in 2000.  The World Bank estimated Singapore's 2000 GNI per 
capita at US$24,9103, ranking it 21st on its list, with GNI per capita comparable to countries such 
as Australia, Germany, France, Sweden and UK.   
To attract increasingly mobile factors of capital, information, and talent upon which the 
continued economic growth of Singapore depends, the government has paid particular attention 
to ensuring that immobile factors (that include land, housing, infrastructure, public services, 
labor, social and political culture) complement growth (Phang, 2000b).  In the next two sections, 
we recount how decisions taken on airport and rail development, respectively, by the Singapore 
government were at variance with recommendations emerging from Cost-Benefit Analysis, but 
were considered necessary to support external competitiveness.  The last section concludes 
with a discussion of the key issues arising from the study of these complex decisions. 
                                                
3   World Development Indicators database, World Bank, April 2002.  In 2001, the average nominal 
exchange rate was S$1.79 to US$1.  All S$ figures cited refer to current market prices. 
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2. Strategic Infrastructure Investment Decisions in the Development of Changi Airport 
Changi International Airport is a major air transport hub.  A strong national airline, liberal air policy, and bold 
airport infrastructure investment decisions have made Singapore a popular base for international airline companies.  
In 2001, the airport was served by 59 airlines operating over 3,250 weekly services linking 139 cities in 50 countries.  
It handled 28.2 million passengers and 1.5 million tones of airfreight.  Changi has consistently won numerous awards 
for best airport (20 best airport awards in 2001).  These numbers are despite its small domestic market.  Changi 
Airport has had to overcome the tremendous huddle of a lack of hinterland population to develop as the hub airport in 
Southeast Asia.    
The decision to relocate the Singapore International Airport from Paya Lebar to Changi was made in 1975.  Paya 
Lebar is situated inland at about 9 km to the west of Changi, which is located at the extreme eastern side of the 
island.  Paya Lebar was built in 1955 and occupied an area of 373 hectares in the 1970s.  It is land bound and the 
southern approach of the runway is over a densely populated area.  The airport is located 11 km from the city center, 
with access through the existing heavily used inland roadway system. Beyond its boundary, Paya Lebar is bounded 
on the west by the Serangoon River. 
Due to the rapid growth of air traffic in the 1960s and early 1970s, the government commissioned a number of 
airport studies.  In 1972, the cabinet accepted the British aviation consultant’s recommendation for the construction of 
a second runway and additional ground facilities by 1978 (Goh 1982, Lee 2000). The alternative of moving to a new 
airport on the former Royal Air Force base at Changi was rejected.  The 1973 oil crisis subsequently led to a review 
of air traffic projections.  A new assessment by American consultants recommended keeping to the planned schedule 
for Paya Lebar.    
As the then Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew recollected in his memoirs (2000, p.230): 
` I was not satisfied and wanted the option of moving to Changi reconsidered.  I had flown over Boston’s Logan 
Airport and been impressed that the noise footprint of planes landing and taking off was over water.  A second 
runway at Paya Lebar would take aircraft right over the heart of Singapore city.  A committee of senior officials 
again studied the alternative of building two runways at Changi by 1977 and recommended we stay with the 
Paya Lebar second runway.  But once built, we would be saddled with the noise pollution for many years.’ 
A Special Committee on Airport Development was formed in early 1975 to conduct further feasibility studies on the 
options.  Citing Lee (2000, p.231) again, 
`The committee believed that the first Changi runway could be ready by 1980 and the second by 1982, whereas 
the second Paya Lebar runway could only be ready by 1984 because of the need to divert the Serangoon River 
and compact the soil of the riverbed.  Saigon and Vietnam had just fallen to the communists.  Growth in 
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Southeast Asia was likely to slow down as communist insurgencies spread through the region.  But to base 
decisions on a pessimistic scenario might well bring it about.’ 
The Special Committee also favored Changi for the following additional reasons (Goh 1982): 
(i) Better road access. 
(ii) No interruption to air traffic movements at Paya Lebar Airport while Changi was under construction. 
(iii) Less residential areas affected by air and noise pollution. 
(iv) Better airport approach via the sea than Paya Lebar Airport where aircrafts had to fly over city 
areas. 
(v) Less hazards, and the Paya Lebar option also entailed sterilization of large tracts of economically 
useful lands because of the height control on buildings near the airport. 
The above factors of accessibility, environmental benefits, and economic development benefits associated with land use 
were obviously critical to the decision.  Nowadays, one would expect these factors to be quantified.  In June 1975, the 
Singapore government decided to convert the then existing military airport at Changi into a new civilian airport instead of 
building a second runway at the Paya Lebar Airport.  It was to be, in Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s words, `the best S$1.5 billion 
investment we ever made’ (2000, p.231). 
      Changi International Airport, built partly from land reclaimed from the sea, began operations in 1981 with a capacity of 
12 million passengers per annum (mppa).  The airport is well connected to the rest of the island via two expressways, the 
East Coast Parkway and the Pan Island Expressway; the MRT (rail) extension to the airport was recently completed (in 
2002). The airport has become known for its policy of investing in infrastructure capacity ahead of demand.  Within three 
years of its operation, although the first terminal showed no sign of approaching capacity, the government approved the 
construction of a second passenger terminal at Changi in 1984.  Terminal 2, expected to double the passenger handling 
capacity at Changi Airport, was completed in 1990.  Even as the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore celebrated the 
opening of Terminal 2, it announced that plans were underway for the construction of Terminal 3.  Construction work on 
Terminal 3 began only 10 years later in 2000 and the terminal is scheduled to open in 2006/2007 at a cost of S$1.5 billion.  
Designed to handle 20 mppa, the new terminal will bring capacity at Changi to 64 mppa – more than 1 million per week.  
(In 2001, the airport handled 28 million passengers.) The new terminal is expected to allow Changi to handle traffic until 
2020, reflecting the airport’s philosophy to provide for capacity well ahead of time.  Investments in airport capacity have 
also been complemented by a host of efficiency improvements and amenities designed to further distinguished the airport 
from its rivals (Bowen 2000).  
While some economists have criticized this over-provision strategy as one of the factors behind Singapore’s low total 
factor productivity record in the past, airport construction together with a liberal airline competition policy comprise two of 
the most important means utilized to influence the development of airline networks.  Bowen (2000), in a comparative study 
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of the five major airport hubs in Southeast Asia describes a multihub system in which several large hubs vie for 
intraregional and long haul traffic.  Within this system, Singapore is predominant, enjoying a commanding lead over both 
Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok in terms of international airline capacity.  
An overprovision strategy is clearly inconsistent with short run efficiency considerations.  However investing in 
capacity far in advance of actual need represents a strategic move to maximize long run growth and maintain its position 
as the leading Southeast Asia hub airport by discouraging competition or deterring entry. 
 
3.    Strategic Infrastructure Investment Decisions in the Development of the Urban  
 Rail Network 
Policymakers in Singapore also paid meticulous attention to the land transport sector: the regulation of car ownership 
and usage, the development of a sustainable public transport sector, as well as the development of a comprehensive road 
and rail network.  In 1960, there were about 800 km of roads, but the length of roads was more than doubled within ten 
years, and by 1990, the road network had grown to nearly 3000 km.  The two expressways that serve Changi Airport, the 
East Coast Parkway and the Pan Island Expressway, were the first expressways to be built in the country.  In this section, 
we focus on the development of Singapore’s rail network and highlight two milestone decisions.  The first pertains to the 
decision made in 1982 to proceed with a S$5 billion dollar investment on a 67-km mass rapid transit system.  The second 
relates to the 1996 White Paper on land transport that resulted in a relaxation of the criteria for the financing of rail 
investments. 
 
Singapore’s Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) System: The First Stage 
The idea to build a rail transit system, eventually called the MRT, was first discussed in the 
early 1970s.  While the government wanted Singapore to have a healthy and vibrant public 
transport system, it did not wish public transport to be a continual drain on government funds. The 
bus system in Singapore had always operated (and continues to operate) without direct public 
subsidy.  Fares and other non-operating revenue must cover the costs of operating the system, 
including the replacement cost of buses as they reach the end of their useful life.   
The study process for the development of the first stage of the MRT was extremely long and 
detailed, comprising the better part of a decade.  Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the various options 
were conducted with assistance from United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, a 
team from Harvard University, and private sector consultants from Wilbur Smith and Associates.  
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World Bank consultants were of the opinion that the Wilbur Smith CBA study had overestimated the 
operating costs of bus and underestimated rail construction costs. A subsequent review by a team 
of Harvard economists reiterated the World Bank’s views and questioned the assumptions made by 
Wilbur Smith (Rimmer, 1986).  Despite these arguments against the rail, the government finally 
made the decision to have an S$5 billion MRT system in 1982. 
It was felt that the MRT system would improve competitiveness in attracting the kind of higher value added 
investments desired by Singapore, especially in the financial and business sector.  A quote from Mohring (1983) that is 
still relevant to rail development today: 
`… failure to build the MRT might lead some activities to locate not just away from the 
Singapore Central Area but away from Singapore.  With location away from Singapore 
would come a reduced demand for Singapore workers.  With reduced demand would come 
reduced real earnings.  The most likely candidates for location away from Singapore come 
from among those activities which have contributed to major office-building booms in North 
American cities: law, banking, business and financial services.  Continued growth of 
Singapore as an international financial centre just conceivably might have hinged on the 
presence of the MRT…. A higher influx of high finance will increase the demand for 
Singaporeans and other Singapore owned factors of production…' 
Mohring provocatively entitled his article `The Singapore MRT: What price a large central area 
workforce?’  Mohring estimated the directly measurable real rate of return of less than 2 percent.  
However, the benefit implications of a substantially larger workforce in the Central Area that was 
possible only with the MRT `cannot be lightly put aside, and are extraordinarily difficult to quantify’.   
Other than CBA, the financial viability of the proposed rail system was the other key element 
of the MRT studies.  Most rail systems in North America and Europe are heavily subsidised by the 
government. In the United States, for example, public transport systems rarely recover more than 
50% of the operating costs from users.  To improve the financial sustainability of the proposed rail 
system in Singapore, service would be limited to the Central Business District and outlying areas 
with heavy demand.  The government insisted that the revenue generated from MRT fares should 
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cover operating and maintenance costs, including the replacement of operating assets like rolling 
stock.  Put differently, if the government paid for the capital cost of the project, the system should 
be able to continue to operate indefinitely without further financial help from the government.   
Consistent with this philosophy, the government funded the construction cost of the long-
term MRT infrastructure – tunnels, viaducts and stations.   The government also funded the first set 
of operating assets, including trains and signalling systems, that would be expected to wear out and 
require replacement after about 30 years of operation. Commuter fares were set to cover the day-
to-day operating cost of the MRT and, under the License and Operating Agreement (LOA), the 
operator was required to make annual deposits to an Assets Replacement Reserve that would 
accumulate funds to replace the original equipment with a second set in due course.  
By October 1983, the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation (MRTC) was established as a 
statutory board and a ceremonial groundbreaking ushered in a new era in Singapore’s public 
transport system.  Four years and about S$5 billion later, the modern MRT system was ready for 
operations with sleek, quiet and air-conditioned trains.  By 1999, the train operator, the SMRT, 
reported a ridership of 346 million passengers, turnover of $353 million and a profit before tax of 
$121 million.  While the projected employment figure for 2000 used in the 1981 CBA studies was 
1430 thousand, actual employment in 2000 was 46.5 percent higher at 2,095 thousand. 
 
The 1996 White Paper: A World Class Land Transport System4 
In 1995, several government agencies involved in the planning, development, implementation and management 
of land transport were merged to form the Land Transport Authority (LTA), a new statutory board under the Ministry of 
Communications (now the Ministry of Transport).  The LTA’s stated mission is to provide Singaporeans with a “world class 
transport system”.  Shortly after its formation, the LTA drafted a White Paper that set out how it intended to achieve this 
vision, including the initiatives it would undertake in the short and long term.  The White Paper left no question about the 
importance of public transport to achieving Singapore’s transportation goals.  LTA sought to increase the percentage of 
public transport trips by making transit more accessible, more convenient, more comfortable and faster.   
                                                
4 See Phang and Walder (2000) for more detailed description and analysis of the public transport 
sector in Singapore. 
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The White Paper also pointed out that “buses cannot be the solution for a compact city like 
Singapore”.5  To reinforce this point, the White Paper noted the importance of comprehensive rail 
networks in other cities of high density (London, Paris and Tokyo most prominently) and indicated 
that Singapore would need to develop a comparable network over time.   The explicitly stated target 
was to have “as high a percentage of trips on a quality public transport system as Zurich, where 
75% of the trips into the city centre are by public transport.”6  A key issue related to this target 
modal split was the proposed change in the financing formula for rail investments.   
In the 1996 White Paper, the LTA proposed moving away from the approach for financing 
rail described above because it was felt that asset inflation placed the burden of paying for the 
future operating assets on the present generation of commuters. Assuming an asset inflation of 5%, 
the LTA estimated that the first set of operating assets, which had cost S$1.6 billion when the 
system was constructed in 1987, would cost S$6.9 billion by 2017 when they were due for 
replacement.  The LTA recognized that a sharply higher fare would be required if the new assets 
were to be supported by deposits to the Asset Replacement Reserve.   
The LTA White Paper proposed to revise the requirement for asset replacement as follows: 
The Government to continue funding infrastructure and the first set of operating assets, 
and commuters to continue paying fares which cover operating costs including 
depreciation.  However, the second set of operating assets will be financed by fare 
revenue covering only the historical cost of the first set of operating assets, while 
Government co-finances the balance.7 
Thus, when the present operating assets are due for replacement in 2017 at a projected cost of 
S$6.9 billion, the operator would pay S$1.6 billion while the government would pay the remaining 
S$5.3 billion.  In another 30 years, when the second set of assets would be due for replacement, 
the Asset Replacement Reserve will have to come up with S$6.9 billion and the government will 
                                                
5 LTA White Paper, page 44. 
6 LTA White Paper, page 8. 
7 LTA White Paper, Executive Summary, p. VII  
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again pay the inflationary costs.  In this way, each generation would pay for the operating assets 
that they consume.8 
The LTA White Paper was presented to Parliament on 2 January 1996 and was approved 
by the government soon after.  The change in financing formula paved the way for Cabinet approval 
of proposals to expand the rail system as shown in Table 1. By 2006, the rail network length is 
expected to increase to 145 km (see Figure 1). 
                                                
8 Figures are from the LTA White Paper, p.60. 
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4.    Key issues  
The previous two sections recount how the decisions for the creation of Singapore’s Changi Airport and Mass Rapid 
Transit system were at variance with recommendations emerging from thorough efforts at Cost-Benefit Analysis.  The 
continued expansion of capacity at Changi also appears to be inconsistent with the efficient micro-economic management 
of infrastructure.  The decisions to proceed were in the final analysis based on the argument that these investments were 
specifically needed in order to support Singapore’s external competitiveness both directly in term of the airport and 
indirectly in terms of the support to an efficient city given by the MRT.  These decisions help surface a number of 
questions and issues for which there are no easy answers. 
A key issue is whether Singapore’s provision of airport capacity in advance of requirements 
prudent macroeconomic planning or inefficient micro-economic management of infrastructure.  
Given the growth in air traffic in the region, the airport uses capacity expansion as a purposeful 
investment signaling strategy in order to capture new demand and tilt the market share in the 
Southeast Asia region towards Changi.9  There is of course a risk that too much or too little new 
capacity may be supplied generally relative to the growth in traffic.  Current airport development 
plans in Singapore, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur may well lead to under utilization due to the 
proximity of the three locations (Chin, 2001).  Given the risk, airports have good reason to 
announce expansion intentions well in advance to influence the decisions of competing airports.   
Such a strategy is likely to bring about a better outcome for the airport as expectations of airlines 
concerning future network developments are vital to the continued growth of the hub.  This would 
require analysis of the relative costs of providing a given level of capacity now rather than later.  
This game consideration of how much, and how far ahead, excess capacity is needed to make 
airline planners confident of the continuing dominance of the hub could well be the most difficult 
part of the analysis.  
In the case of the MRT, a key issue is whether some of the investment in offices and plants, and 
related increases in productivity and employment, were a direct consequence, and therefore part of 
the benefits of the original investment.  Moreover, the MRT had a significant impact on the spatial 
                                                
9  See Dixit and Skeath (1999), Chapter 9 on `Games with Strategic Moves’. 
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structure of the city – delivering workers not only to the center but also to some of the areas of 
employment that have grown up in outlying areas.  It also made feasible the development of high-
density new towns in outlying areas that would have been considered remote if not for the MRT.   In 
other contexts where land scarcity does not represent such a constraint (as it does in Singapore), 
the benefits of land value enhancements and increased land use density along the rail corridor are 
regarded as transfers as the assumption is made of a corresponding reduction in density/land 
values elsewhere.  However, in the case of land scarce Singapore, the impact of the MRT on the 
intensity of land use not only in the CBD but around rail stations generally as well, may well 
represent a relaxation of a very real supply side urban space constraint (Phang, 2000a).    
 The above deliberations on the impact of capacity on long-term growth require explicit 
consideration of the link between infrastructure provision and economic development.  While a 
multi-criteria decision making framework such as those recently adopted by the FTA in the US and 
the DETR in the UK can help to ensure that some of the expected economic development impacts 
are considered, the final decision is left (rightly) to the interpretation of politicians.   Certainly, one of 
the biggest factors in the success to date of the investments reviewed in this article in fact have 
been the much higher than expected growth of the Singapore economy as a whole.  It is likely that 
the political judgment, to allow for possible rapid future growth of demand and of the economy, was 
more important than if greater efforts have been expanded to deal more elaborately with benefits 
that were difficult to quantify.  Even if a more sophisticated appraisal framework had been in 
place,10 it is likely that the resultant figures, being based on excessively low overall growth 
assumptions, might not have justified the investments in terms of strict cost-benefit or multi-criteria 
analysis.   
This brings us back to the nebulous links between transport investments and economic 
growth, the subject of a recent book Transport Investment and Economic Development by Banister 
and Berechman (2000). To what extent did the investments contribute to Singapore’s impressive 
                                                
10   Bearing in mind the need to guard against what Mackie and Preston (1998) refer to as 
`the greatest danger in transport investment analysis’ – that of appraisal optimism. 
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growth record (as opposed to other factors such as trade and economic policies that are more 
traditionally considered), and to the greater than forecasted demand growth that have made the 
solutions more viable than expected in CBA terms?  How does one quantify or apportion more 
precisely transport’s contributions to the volume of investment, labour influx, scale and 
agglomeration economies?  
According to Banister and Berechman (2000), the evidence is mixed on the role that 
accessibility changes have in generating economic development in advanced economies where the 
infrastructure is already well established, where more complex  market systems are in operation, 
and where transport costs play a less important role in the total production costs.  The impact of 
transportation infrastructure expansion on the economy tends to lessen quite rapidly as more 
capacity is added.  In the case of airport development, the issue of contention appears to be that 
while it would help to increase the competitiveness of one location over another, the net benefit to 
the national economy as a whole would be small.  Evidence based on case studies on the 
economic impact of rail in North American cities also suggests that impacts are not uniform and 
only occur where other economic conditions already favor development.   
In the context of Singapore, a number of factors serve to differentiate it from other cities: (i) 
As a city-state, the regional versus national concerns over geographical distribution of benefits do 
not arise.  (ii) Competition between the airports in the capital cities of Southeast Asia to be the 
regional hub is expected to intensify in the future. (iii) The development of the industries most often 
associated with a global city (financial, media, education and health services), and the transport 
infrastructure that can support such development, are very much a part of Singapore’s overall 
economic strategy.  (iv) Lastly, similar to other high-density Asian cities in Japan and Hong Kong, 
rail transport does and has been used by urban planners to dictate development patterns as 
employment is highly centralized and the cost of private car usage is relatively expensive.  In 
conclusion, while it cannot be denied that Changi airport and the MRT rail system has helped to 
reinforce changes favorable to Singapore’s economic growth in the past two decades, the impact of 
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future infrastructure expansion on the growth rate of a more developed economy is less clear.  
There is certainly room for further research dealing more explicitly with the economic growth and 
productivity impacts of major transport investments in differing contexts. 
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Table 1     Post 1996 Rail Development in Singapore 
Lines Length Cost (S$)* Opening 
North-East MRT Line  20 km 5b 2002 
Bukit Panjang LRT system  8 km 285m 1999 
Sengkang LRT system  11 km 302m 2002 
Punggol LRT system  13 km 354m 2004 
MRT extension to Changi Airport  6 km 700m 2002 
Circle Line (Stage 1 – Marina Line) 5 km 1b 2006 
Circle Line (Stage 2) 6 km 1.4b 2006 
Bukit Timah, Eastern Region and Jurong 
Region Lines 
Under 
study 
11b Within next 10 
to 15 years 
* In 2001, the average nominal exchange rate was S$1.79 to US$1.   
Source:  Land Transport Authority website at www.lta.gov.sg 
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Figure 1  The Rail System in 2006 
 
Source: Land Transport Authority website: www.lta.gov.sg. 
 
 
